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Rationales to
Consider for a New Allocation Paradigm
POPULATION GROWTH
Overall population growth and a continuing shift to coastal
communities will exacerbate inequities between commercial and
recreational anglers in the decades to come.
According to a NOAA publication on population growth: “Total
coastal population between the years 1980 and 2003 increased by 33
million people or 28 percent, roughly consistent with the nation’s
rate of increase. Coastal population within the Pacific region
showed the largest gain during this time with almost 12 million
people, followed by the Northeast with 8 million people. The
Southeast region, however, exhibited the largest rate of change
with a 58 percent increase, followed by the Pacific at 46 percent,
and the Gulf of Mexico at 45 percent. The rate of growth in the
Northeast and Great Lakes regions was considerably smaller with 18
percent and 6 percent increases, respectively.
The Southeast has increasingly become a leading destination for
retirees and job-seekers. Between the years 1995 and 2000, the
Census Bureau reported that the highest levels of migration were
to states that fall within the Southeast region and the Gulf of
Mexico region, particularly to Florida, Georgia, and North
Carolina.
More significantly, “Coastal counties constitute only 17 percent
of the total land area of the United States (not including
Alaska), but account for 53 percent of the total population.”
PARTICIPATION IN MARINE RECREATIONAL
FISHING
It is clear that more and more people will be moving to the coasts
and that trend is unlikely to abate in the foreseeable future.
Recreational fishing is a popular sport, and is frequently cited
as an important reason many choose to relocate to coastal areas.
We can expect participation and
demand for access to recreational fishing activities to continue
to rise:
“The total number of resident participants in marine recreational
fishing in the Southeast region has averaged approximately 4
million residents during the 1990s. Florida has had the largest
number of resident participants followed by North Carolina and
Louisiana. Based on the survey results and Census Bureau
population projections, it is expected that the number of
participants in the region will increase at an average annual rate
of 1.34 percent through 2025.
The total number of participants in the region would increase to
approximately 5.5 million in
2025 with
Florida, North Carolina and Louisiana continuing to have the
largest number of resident participants. This increase in the
number of participants is due to a general increase in the
population throughout the Southeast. Despite this overall
increase, the participation rate for marine recreational fishing
is expected to decline as individuals in the prime participation
cohort groups (white males ages 26 to 55) become a smaller
proportion of the total population in each coastal state in the
region.” (Current and Future Participation in the Marine
Recreational Fishing in the Southeast U.S. Region J. Walter Milon,
NOAA Technical Memorandum, NMFS-F/SPO-44 September 2000)
Additionally, data from the Marine Recreational Fishing Statistics
Survey reveal increasing participation in marine recreational
fishing:

Finally, the
recently released U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Survey (conducted
every five years) showed a slight decline in the number of
saltwater anglers in recent years, but a large increase in the
effort (fishing trips) and expenditures generated by the reduced
number of anglers. In the future, we can expect more people to
participate in recreational fishing and expect some portion of the
total allowable catch.
LEGAL UNDERPINNINGS TO ALLOCATION
Allocation is inevitable in most fisheries in the United States.
Marine biologists, resource economists and sociologists have all
written volumes on the factors and the philosophy underlying the
decision to allocate. Many would argue that allocations should
involve consideration of past, present and future uses. Some would
argue that allocation criteria include consideration of interests
beyond the fishing industry, like consumers of fish and the
interests of the public in knowing healthy resources are available
to them even though they have no intention of using them.
CCA’s view is more limited. It focuses on the specific criteria
outlined in the Magnuson-Stevens Act and in the existing
guidelines published by NMFS.
The issue of allocation is a complicated and, if done properly, a
multi-faceted consideration. Generally it involves the
distribution of fishing benefits among users with disparate
degrees of dependence on the resource itself. In some cases,
fishery management plans and managers come to the fishery with the
allocation already in place as a result of geography, historic use
or economics.
Most of the initial allocations under the Magnuson Act were made
to preserve the status quo among the existing users. Some of these
allocations were among commercial gear types (longlines vs. hook
and line vs. purse seine in the bluefin tuna fishery). Some
fisheries have been allocated through the use of sector quotas
without any recognition that there has been an allocation (gag
grouper and most of the North Pacific stocks).
Lastly, in many cases fisheries have been conducted without any
regard to allocating fishing privileges among user groups (inshore
and offshore shrimp fisheries). The spectrum of allocation ranges
from fisheries where no allocations exists (shrimp) to ones where
virtually every gear type and sector has its own quota (bluefin
tuna).
There are three
instances when allocation is necessary:
1. When it is specifically called for by the statute (16USC
1883(D)). The red snapper fishery is such an example, although
this has never happened.
2. When a fishery needs to be rebuilt and either the benefits of
the rebuilding or the restriction need to be redistributed to
ensure that the various sectors are being treated fairly and
equitably.
3. Where the implementation of the new provisions of the Act
addressing accountability necessitates separation of sectors in a
single fishery. This is in no way mandatory but may be necessary
to treat different sectors fairly.
The principles
and obligations for making allocations are spelled out in the Act,
which requires the following:
1. National Standard number four requires all conservation and
management measures to not discriminate between residents of
different States;
2. Allocations shall be fair and equitable for all
fishermen; reasonably calculated to promote conservation; carried
out in such manner that no individual, corporation, or other
entity acquires and excessive share of such privileges. ( 16 USC
1851(a)(4)) This is one of the original provisions of the Act and
has been expanded on in the national standard guidelines (50 CFR
600.325) and by a number of law suits. Two parts of this provision
are notable:
·
The first sentence applies to all residents and repeats a long
standing constitutional requirement that the regulations can not
discriminate between residents of different states. A provision
that restricted the sale of fish to the residents of New Jersey
might not be approvable if the same resource could be sold
anywhere.
·
The second provision deals directly with allocations. If it
becomes necessary to allocate fishing privileges, the allocations
must be fair and equitable to all fishermen---not the public at
large or the national interest. Fairness and equity is determined
by the record upon which the allocation is made. The record must
support the logic of the decision being made and must have
reflected a breadth of considerations when being made. An
allocation to one sector without consideration of the historic
catch pattern, social implications, impact on coastal communities,
or the economics of other sectors is unlikely to be found as fair
whereas an allocation that resulted after a reflection of all of
this might be.
In 1996, the Act was amended to require the Secretary (in
fisheries that are overfished) to adopt regulations that allocate
both overfishing restrictions and recovery benefits fairly and
equitably among the sectors of the fishery (16 USC 1854 (e)(4)(B).
This requirement only applies to fisheries with rebuilding plans,
but generally reflects the same kind of analysis in National
Standard 4. NMFS clearly views this as an affirmative obligation
and included such a measure in the recently approved red snapper
regulations.
We should stress that this is an affirmative obligation and that,
in addition, it is an ongoing requirement. Every time the benefits
and restrictions change there ought to be a reconsideration of
whether they are fair or not. The simple “one time decision” in a
plan like red snapper without any consideration of the improvement
of the stock is not approvable. The distribution of the benefits
among the directed and bycatch fisheries is the ongoing
responsibility of the Council throughout the rebuilding plan.
How the decision of fairness will be made was addressed in the
2006 amendments to the Magnuson Act. Fishery Management plans must
include a description of the commercial, recreational and charter
fishing sectors, including its economic impact and, where
possible, quantify trends in landings (16USC1853 (a)(13). [The
purpose of this language was to give the Council economic
information on the impacts of management measures when it
developed them.]
A similar analysis is required of the Secretary when he approves a
plan or amendment but it is not factored into the Council’s early
decision process. In addition to this requirement, Congress added
a specific requirement for plans that allocate amongst sectors:
"To the extent that rebuilding plans or other conservation and
management measures which reduce the overall harvest in a fishery
are necessary, allocate, taking into consideration the economic
impact of the harvest restrictions or recovery benefits on the
fishery participants in each sector, any harvest restrictions or
recovery benefits fairly and equitably amongst the commercial,
recreational and charter fishing sectors in the fishery" (16USC
1853 (a)(14).
The provision is quoted accurately, leading one to ask, “what does
this section mean?” The last clause seems to put the same
obligation on the Council as is presently on the Secretary, namely
the fair distribution of restrictions and benefits. The first part
can be read to say that whenever harvest levels are decreased the
Council must allocate taking into consideration the participants
in each sector.
The two-plan requirements and the obligation of the Secretary
requiring redistribution of benefits and restrictions ought to be
read together. Taken that way, then the obligation to allocate is
mandatory in rebuilding fisheries and possibly in any fishery
where harvest levels are reduced for any reason. If this
interpretation is correct then any time a Council or the Secretary
puts in new catch limits in a rebuilding fishery, they have to
look at the economics of the fishery to determine if the
distribution of the recovery benefits or restriction is fair. Then
they can also look at other factors, like historic catch levels,
although they are not required to.
There are no requirements in the Act to use historic catches,
vessel size, race, color or creed in allocation criteria. Most of
the elements used in plans so far have been established by the
managers to make sure the allocation met the fair and equitable
requirement of National Standard four:
1. Allocations are not required under the Act except in
fisheries under rebuilding plans or where harvest levels are
reduced;
2. Whenever they occur, the Act requires the Secretary and the
Council to do an analysis of the economic impact of the proposed
conservation and management measures on all of the participants
in each of the sectors of the fishery;
3. The obligation is ongoing---the failure to address the
distribution of benefits and restrictions by both the Secretary
and the Council is a fatal procedural flaw;
4, The process allows the use of historic data but the use of the
economic information is required;
5. The final product of the generic allocation plan ought to
include a series of considerations (economic impact, historic
catch, demographic shifts, impact on coastal communities, impact
on fishing communities, etc.) and a process that allows them to be
weighed.
ECONOMICS IN ALLOCATION
Broadly defined, economists use two different metrics to examine
the implications of policy decisions on society; economic value
and economic impacts. The first, economic value, also known as
economic benefit or welfare, monetizes the value society places on
resources or activities. Economic value should be the metric used
to decide between one course of action and another (Freeman 1993,
Edwards 1990, and others).
Comparing value estimates between two proposed allocation schemes
answers the question, is society better or worse off as a result
of a particular allocation?
The second metric, economic impacts, examines the flow of
expenditures on fishery resource activities and products as that
spending moves through a community. While economic impact measures
should not be used to choose a course of action, they can be used
to examine what particular sectors in the economy are hurt or
helped by a particular policy and by how much.
Economic impact analysis examines the distribution of value
changes identified when comparing benefits, making both types of
analysis complementary, and, as will be shown below, quite
necessary when data on value cannot be obtained.
For both the recreational and commercial sectors, total value is
the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus. Producer surplus
is measured by examining the supply curves for commercial
producers of seafood, including harvesters, processors,
wholesalers, and distributors, as well as the supply curves for
recreational service providers such as charter and head boat
operators. Essentially, producer surplus is the difference between
the cost of producing the good and the dollar value generated by
the sale of the good.
Consumer surplus is measured by examining the demand for goods at
the consumer level, including the demand for fish at markets and
restaurants and the demand for recreational fishing trips.
Consumer surplus is the difference between the amount society
would be willing to pay for the good in question, and what
consumers actually paid for the good in the marketplace.
Value is not static across all allocations and, as any consumer
obtains more of a good, the marginal value of obtaining the next
unit of that good falls. That is, there are diminishing returns to
additional consumption of any good and this is a fundamental tenet
of consumer demand, which has important implications for
allocation decisions.
A similar tenet exists for producers, but does not always hold
true depending on the character of the industry. Table 1 includes
a brief example for a hypothetical fishery. For example, the
current allocation between commercial and recreational users is
50/50. An economist measures the commercial sector value to be $50
million, the recreational value to be $75 million, and total value
of fishery to be $125 million (sum of commercial and recreational
value). This does not mean that the recreational sector should get
100 percent of the allocation. Because of the economic property of
diminishing marginal returns described above, the total value of a
100 percent recreational allocation in this example is $110
million, or less than the 50/50 allocation.
While this example above suggests that allocation should be
changed in favor of the recreational sector, how much should it be
increased? Economists say that society’s benefit will be greatest
when the allocation is set such that the marginal value, or the
value of the next fish in the allocation, is equal across the two
sectors. In the example shown in Table 1, total value is maximized
when the allocation is set at 25 percent commercial and 75 percent
recreational, or where the two marginal values are both $4/fish
caught.
Table 1. Value Table for a Hypothetical
Fishery.
|
Allocation |
Commercial Sector |
Recreational Sector |
Total National Value (Millions $) |
|
Commercial |
Recreational |
Marginal Value |
Total Value (Millions $) |
Marginal Value |
Total Value (Millions $) |
|
0% |
100% |
$6 |
$0 |
$3 |
$110 |
$110 |
|
25% |
75% |
$4 |
$30 |
$4 |
$105 |
$135 |
|
50% |
50% |
$3 |
$50 |
$5 |
$75 |
$125 |
|
75% |
25% |
$2 |
$60 |
$6 |
$50 |
$110 |
|
100% |
0% |
$1 |
$80 |
$8 |
$0 |
$80 |
For the recreational sector, total value or net benefits, is the
sum of the consumer surplus from recreational fishing participants
and producer surplus from charter and head boat operators. For the
commercial sector, total value is the sum of consumer surplus from
the purchase of seafood products in markets and restaurants and
the producer surplus from harvesters, processors, wholesalers, and
distributors of those fishery products.
Estimating consumer surplus entails estimating demand curves for
both the angling experience and for consumer purchases of seafood.
On the recreational side of the equation, estimating consumer
surplus involves specialized surveys of anglers. Work is needed to
increase the number of fisheries covered by these types of
surveys. On the seafood consumer side, data on the prices and
quantities of seafood purchased in markets and restaurants is
needed.
Unfortunately this type of data does not currently exist.
Estimating producer surplus requires data on the costs and
earnings of all the various businesses involved in the production
and sale of seafood or recreational services. Very little of this
type of information exists, making the calculation of producer
surplus difficult at best and impossible at worst. This is where
economic impact models can provide some needed information, albeit
imperfect.
Economic impact models use business transaction data collected
annually by several agencies within the U.S. government to create
a map of economic activity occurring in the economy between
consumers and suppliers. These models produce three measures of
economic performance: output, value added, and employment. In the
absence of value, value added or contribution to gross domestic
product (GDP) is an acceptable stand-in, but one that typically
overstates true value across recreational and commercial sectors (Kirkley
et al 2000).
Unfortunately, commercial fishing and charter and head boat
businesses are typically poorly represented in the national data.
Very few studies of this type have been conducted for saltwater
recreational fishing. One particularly good study was conducted by
Kirkley, et al. (2000) regarding striped bass allocation in
Virginia. The study used a specialized survey of recreational
anglers and a cost and earnings survey of commercial fishermen.
Using the commercial cost and earnings data and the recreational
survey data, the study concludes that a 100 percent allocation to
the recreational sector maximized net benefits to Virginia at a
value of $27.6 million. However, changing the split to 50/50 only
reduced total value to $24.6 million. The authors felt a
sensitivity analysis was necessary to explore this result further.
One method to examine this sensitivity is to highly inflate the
commercial value and ratchet down the recreational value, a type
of least/most analysis. As a result, the team chose to use the
value added of all sectors on the commercial side (most estimate)
while using just the angler demand model and ignoring the for-hire
sector on the recreational side (least estimate). Under this
scenario, benefits to society would be maximized with a 75 percent
allocation to the commercial sector. However, to support this
level of benefit on the commercial side, the retail price of
striped bass would have to exceed $32/pound. After this and other
types of sensitivity analysis the team concludes that the 100
percent allocation result is sound.
In 2000, NMFS estimated the value added of all recreational
expenditures to be $12 billion. NMFS is currently updating these
estimates for 2006 and they look to be much larger. Annually, NMFS
publishes the value added of all economic activity related to the
seafood industry in Fisheries of the United States. For 2000, the
seafood industry in the U.S. generated $27.9 billion in value
added (FUS 2000). That estimate includes the processing,
wholesaling, distributing and retailing of imports and also
includes industrial species and other species with no recreational
component. Currently it is possible to calculate value added for
any commercial or recreational fishery.
Recent calculations of value added in the summer flounder fishery
indicate that the current allocation is not efficient or in the
best interest of society at large. In 2006, the value added
generated by anglers targeting or catching summer flounder was
$669.3 million using MRFSS directed effort and expenditure and
impact estimates from NMFS (Gentner et al. 2001, Steinback et al.
2001, Steinback et al. 2004). Taking the commercial summer
flounder landings from FUS and using the NMFS value added model,
the value added of all commercial activity from harvester to
consumer was $79.7 million or more than eight times less than the
recreational contribution to this country (FUS 2006).
Kirkley et al. also notes that it is important to examine social
consequences. Large changes in allocations can lead to community
impacts, labor displacement and loss of infrastructure that should
be incorporated into an analysis. Additionally, their report did
not examine substitutes in any meaningful way. That is, consumers
might not change their fish protein purchase decisions, but
instead switch to another species of fish. This would have the
effect of lowering the value of the commercial side.
In summary, in order to complete the most rudimentary allocation
analysis using commercial and recreational value added,
recreational and commercial fisheries economic impact models are
needed. On the recreational side, estimates of angler expenditures
and impacts are available from either the USFWS estimates or NMFS
estimates with both agencies having 2006 estimates available. On
the commercial side, NMFS currently has the value added model used
for FUS. NMFS is also in development of a national-level
commercial model that includes everything through the retail
sector thereby updating the FUS model created in the early 1980s.
It is widely acknowledged, however that this type of technique
overstates actual value in each sector. Additionally, it is a
static methodology that does not capture angler or harvester
behavior.
Ideally, then, specialized surveys of recreational anglers would
be necessary in each fishery to develop marginal values. The
surveys exist for red snapper, grouper, summer flounder, and
salmon, rockfish, and halibut in Oregon, Washington, and Alaska.
Additionally, cost and earning data would need to be collected for
the commercial fisheries involved. Currently, few fisheries are
covered by cost and earnings surveys.
Detailed consumer seafood purchase data would also be needed.
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that species-specific information of
this type will ever be collected forward of the harvester.
Instead, economic impact models will be necessary to calculate the
value added from the processing sector through to the consumer as
a proxy for value. When specialized data on either side does not
exist, it may be possible to use the least/most type of
sensitivity analysis to examine allocations, but caution must be
exercised when applying mixed methodologies.
As coastal populations increase, recreational angler values should
increase as well. Recreational mortality will surely rise with
rising participation, increasing the necessity to address
allocation for the health of the stocks. Additionally, reliance on
domestically caught fish for protein will continue its downward
slide, reducing the importance of the commercial industry in
supplying U.S. protein needs. Other resources uses have gone the
same direction, as can be demonstrated by current freshwater
fishing, hunting, and public forest usage.
MANAGEMENT FOR THE CITIZENS OF THE UNITED
STATES
The U.S. is a steward of all of its natural resources---sunfish,
ducks, deer, and striped bass--all of them. The concept that a
private commercial enterprise is necessary to provide the public
with the enjoyment of those resources by selling them to consumers
so they can eat them was rejected by the federal government and
state wildlife managers before 1900. There is no basis in any
federal common law, any wildlife law or the constitution for such
a proposition.
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