We must acknowledge that current marlin stocks are in terrible condition. The primary cause for the decline of these stocks can be directly correlated to the growth of international longlining for tuna and swordfish. Undoubtedly, we have a problem. 

CCA became involved in this issue in the late 1980s, as a result of the inaction of the federal management system in addressing declining billfish populations. The thinking, at the time, was that conservation of billfish only required restrictions on U.S. citizens within U.S. waters to control the decline. The underlying theory was that if the United States controlled its market, preventing the sale and import of Atlantic billfish and controlling the bycatch by its own fleet, the stock would recover. Regulations were established that required the U.S. fleet to discard all billfish caught in U.S. waters. Minimum size limits were put in place for recreational fisherman, and billfish were declared the first federal, marine gamefish. U.S. landings of billfish both recreationally and commercially have now dropped to a point where present landings of marlin do not exceed 200 fish. U.S. commercial mortality for white marlin dropped to about 50 metric tons or about five percent of the total Atlantic mortality.

It was a great plan, but it did not work.

It became clear through the 1990s that the level of catch by domestic vessels was only a small percentage of the total mortality for Atlantic billfish stocks. Recreational fisherman began to see a further decline in abundance, especially in white marlin. This led to an outcry from recreational groups and some discussions with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to address the problem. 

Congress intervened with changes in the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act and the Sustainable Fisheries Act in 1990. Ultimately, NMFS organized the Highly Migratory Species Office in 1997 and began progress toward a solution.

The proposed solution was a set of regulations published in the spring of 1999 and the summer 2000. The regulations addressed longline bycatch by closing large sections of federal waters to the commercial fleet. The theory behind the closures was based on the idea that there are identifiable hot spots in the ocean where the bycatch from longline fleets is significantly higher, and these exclusionary areas could serve as a conservation tool to decrease the bycatch of juvenile swordfish. 

Unfortunately, for this idea to work, there had to be an overlap of the closed areas and displacement of the longline vessels had to minimized. Ironically, NMFS' rule actually increased the destructive bycatch of marlin, sharks, turtles and marine mammals, and incensed recreational fishermen to the point CCA and The Billfish Foundation filed suit challenging the regulation. The suit, which has been joined with suits by the National Coalition for Marine Conservation and other environmental groups and longliners, is now awaiting a decision in Federal District Court. Each plaintiff in these suits is asking the court to return these regulations to NMFS to reevaluate the size and impact of the closed areas. 

In addition to current administrative efforts, there was a concerted effort to accomplish some measurable conservation internationally. Beginning in the mid-1990s, there was a realization that growth in both the size and efficiency of international longline fleets was having a continued detrimental effect on the health of marlin stocks. There was no question that the fleets were having a greater negative biological impact. As the use of the gear type increased in both the tuna and swordfish fisheries, so did the bycatch of marlins. 

In the last five years, three international agreements have set the framework for what could be a solution to the problem of longline bycatch. The first is a set of agreements to hold both member and non-member countries of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT) accountable for conservation restrictions. 

In 1999, there was a recovery plan for swordfish established. This plan was largely the result of U.S. leadership at ICCAT. It could not have been accomplished without the sacrifices of the domestic longline industry, which understood the need to have recovery plan that worked. As important as a recovery plan is for swordfish, ironically swordfish recovery could only further the decline of marlin stocks. 

Therefore, the most significant agreement from a recreational standpoint was accomplished last year when ICCAT agreed to begin to reduce the mortality of marlin and develop a recovery plan for them in 2002. The recovery plan will be the first attempt by ICCAT to develop and plan for something of no commercial value to most of the member countries. The challenge is to provide realistic and constructive management measures that can be implemented by the international longline fleet and enforced. 

Finally, there was the attempt in the last Congress to put a bill together that addressed what many people thought were the four elements required to solve the problem - reduction of effort in the longline fleet, closed areas to reduce bycatch, research to modify gear and/or fishing practices to reduce bycatch, and development of a bycatch-reduction program that could be implemented internationally. 

The effort failed primarily because of the difficulty in getting agreement on which measures were necessary and the federal funds to complete the buyout.

Where are we now?

Federal management of billfish is only thirteen years old, and international management has only just begun. Clearly, there has been a decline in the abundance of both blue and white marlin, and the ultimate results are very uncertain. 

Both domestic and international management entities seem to have agreed on the problem - longline gear is catching billfish and other species at a rate greater than that required to keep the stock in equilibrium. 

We have learned that the problem is international and cannot be solved by simply restricting U.S. activities. That is not to say the restrictions at home do not help internationally. They do. But, a domestic strategy without a clear international strategy will likely only result in further decline of marlin. 

We have learned that the solutions to our problem are largely based on the science at hand. Internationally, ICCAT becomes engaged when the scientists identify a problem. Once identified, the scientific community develops a solution, and within negotiated parameters, ICCAT adopts a series of recommendations to address the problem. Clearly, the key to success in management is ICCAT's science committee. Without it, the U.S. has only its own presence to convince others of the legitimacy of its cause. 

The problem with white marlin stocks - as is the case with all marlins- is centered in international longline harvest. In the next year, measures put in place internationally to reduce white and blue marlin landings will begin to take effect. In addition, domestic efforts looking at ways of reducing the take of marlins by longlines are under discussion in Congress. Increased management and new scientifically supportable measures will be the catalyst needed for a dramatic recovery of white marlin.